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INTRODUCTION 
Few precedents drew Judge Posner’s ire like multifactor 
tests. As he said in one opinion: multifactor tests leave “much to 
be desired—being . . . redundant, incomplete, and unclear.”1 
In this Essay, I endorse Posner’s devastating rejection of a 
tax law multifactor test in Exacto Spring Corp v Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue.2 This prototypical tax multifactor test governed 
the deductibility of salaries paid by corporations to their control-
ling shareholders by comparing the salaries with a list of factors 
that indicated deductibility or nondeductibility.3 Simply put, the 
test stunk. I also explain why the Posner critique applies to simi-
lar multifactor tests in corporate tax law. 
I then describe and critique Posner’s replacement for the mul-
tifactor test—the “independent investor” test. In a nutshell, 
Posner proposed to evaluate the deductibility of the salaries in 
question by reference to investment returns of equity investors in 
the firm paying the allegedly high salaries.4 If the salaries leave 
investment returns that would be adequate for “independent in-
vestors” in the firm, then the salaries in question are presump-
tively deductible.5 Characteristically, Posner’s independent inves-
tor test shifts the judicial focus from a muddled list to the 
economic substance of a transaction. 
Unfortunately, the independent investor test yields some pe-
culiar outcomes. The test functionally makes equity a fixed claim 
 
 † Shibley Family Fund Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
 1 Exacto Spring Corp v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 196 F3d 833, 835 (7th 
Cir 1999), quoting Palmer v City of Chicago, 806 F2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir 1986) (quotation 
marks omitted). See also Teed v Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F3d 763, 766–
67 (7th Cir 2013). 
 2 196 F3d 833 (7th Cir 1999). 
 3 See id at 834. 
 4 See id at 838–39. 
 5 Id. 
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while leaving other claims, such as salary, to absorb residual prof-
its. This is the opposite of the conventional understanding of equity 
claims relative to salary claims. Using data from the Russell 2000 
Index, I show that the mischaracterization leaves many cases in 
which salaries for controlling shareholders are essentially uncon-
strained by the independent investor test. In other cases, the in-
dependent investor test denies deductions for any positive salary. 
As a result, the independent investor test provides a flawed solu-
tion to the problem of policing salary arrangements between cor-
porations and their controlling shareholders. 
If closely held corporations have independent minority share-
holders, however, then a simple variant of the independent inves-
tor test provides a robust test for reasonable salary. If independ-
ent equity investors in fact approve an executive’s salary, then it 
is presumptively reasonable. (This in fact occurred in Exacto 
Spring, as the opinion emphasized.) But when there are no such 
investors, the independent investor test proves unworkable. 
Posner’s independent investor test, however, offers an ideal 
solution to a related problem in corporate tax—determining the 
deductibility of interest payments from corporations to their con-
trolling shareholders. At present, this question is answered by 
another deeply flawed multifactor test. To determine whether in-
terest payments in such transactions should be deductible, courts 
should ask instead whether a credit arrangement provided a re-
turn to the creditor in excess of what an independent investor 
would require. When interest payments to controlling sharehold-
ers exceed this “independent investor” threshold, interest deduc-
tions should be denied. 
The success of this modified independent investor test 
demonstrates the vitality of Posner’s judicial emphasis on sub-
stance over form—in tax law and all other areas. 
I.  MULTIFACTOR TESTS IN CORPORATE TAX LAW AND THE 
POSNER CRITIQUE IN EXACTO SPRING 
While multifactor tests feature prominently in many areas of 
law, they are particularly popular in corporate tax law. Corporate 
tax must distinguish between ordinary corporate disbursements, 
which are deductible or depreciable from income,6 and payments 
 
 6 26 USC § 162(a) (allowing “as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses 
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business”); 26 USC 
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to equity, which are not.7 If payments to equity were deductible 
by corporations like other corporate expenses, then corporate 
profits could always be reduced to zero by having dividends equal 
profits, rendering a corporate income tax ineffectual. Multifactor 
tests are the judicial favorite for distinguishing payments to eq-
uity from other corporate disbursements in a particularly thorny 
context—when holders of equity transact with closely held corpo-
rations as employees or creditors. 
In ordinary contexts, it is easy to distinguish between pay-
ments to equity and other payments. Corporations make discre-
tionary payments to only one party—equity. And corporations 
cannot deduct discretionary distributions to equity.8 With every-
one else, corporations make the payments they are contractually 
obligated to, or analogous payments such as bonuses. Corpora-
tions deduct or capitalize these payments. The market protects 
against manipulation of these categories. Shareholders will not 
agree to excessive salary or interest payments, even though they 
are deductible, because the disguise reduces the shareholders’ re-
sidual claim on corporate income. 
The lines get blurred, however, in closely held corporations. 
If the controlling shareholder of a corporation also is the corpora-
tion’s employee or creditor, then the shareholder/employee/credi-
tor may induce the corporation to disguise (nondeductible) divi-
dends as (deductible) salary or interest. The disguised payments 
reduce returns to equity, but they raise returns to debt or employ-
ment so that the shareholder/employee/creditor is indifferent to 
the label. And the disguised dividends reduce corporate income 
and erode the corporate tax base. Alternatively, if corporations 
benefit from a preferential tax rate (as they do today), then salary 
or interest income to controlling shareholder might be disguised 
as dividends. Whatever the direction of the disguise, tax authori-
ties can no longer rely on a payment’s label as salary, interest, or 
dividend to determine the appropriate tax treatment. 
In place of reliance on listed salaries and interest payments, 
the IRS and courts favor multifactor tests to distinguish between 
 
§ 167(a)(1) (allowing “as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaus-
tion, wear and tear . . . of property used in the trade or business”). 
 7 See, for example, 26 USC § 311(a)(2) (stating that “no gain or loss shall be recog-
nized to a corporation on the distribution (not in complete liquidation) with respect to its 
stock of . . . property”); Exacto Spring, 196 F3d at 835 (describing dividends as “not de-
ductible from corporate income”). 
 8 The rule of nondeductibility is independent of the form of the distribution to eq-
uity. Neither share repurchases nor dividends are deductible. 
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interest payments and dividends or salaries and dividends.9 As 
Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, explained, “Judges tend 
to be partial to multifactor tests, which they believe discipline ju-
dicial decision-making, providing objectivity and predictability.”10 
Thus, a seven-factor test was applied by the lower court in 
Exacto Spring to distinguish between “reasonable” salaries paid 
to employee/shareholders, which are deductible from corporate 
income, and unreasonable salary payments, which are treated as 
dividends.11 In a similar type of case on the distinction between 
interest on debt and equity, the Ninth Circuit distinguished de-
ductible interest payments to creditor/shareholders from nonde-
ductible dividends using an eleven-factor test.12 
In Exacto Spring, Posner delivered a many-sided critique of 
the multifactor test applied by the lower court. I cannot improve 
upon his critique, so I quote him at length. Posner observed that 
the multifactor test was “nondirective” in that “no indication 
[was] given of how the factors are to be weighed in the event they 
don’t all line up on one side.”13 As a result, the multifactor test 
“invite[d] the making of arbitrary decisions based on uncanalized 
discretion or unprincipled rules of thumb.”14 In addition, Posner 
concluded that “the factors do not bear a clear relation either to 
each other or to the primary purpose of section 162(a)(1), which is 
to prevent dividends (or in some cases gifts), which are not de-
ductible from corporate income, from being disguised as salary, 
which is.”15 The multifactor test also “invite[d] the Tax Court to 
set itself up as a superpersonnel department for closely held cor-
porations, a role unsuitable for courts.”16 
Posner argued that the lower court’s puzzling ruling in 
Exacto Spring proved that these concerns were real rather than 
merely theoretical. “Having run through the seven factors, all of 
which either favored the taxpayer or were neutral, the court 
reached a stunning conclusion”—deciding against the taxpayer.17 
 
 9 For a general critique of the use of multifactor tests in tax law, see Edward Yorio, 
Federal Income Tax Rulemaking: An Economic Approach, 51 Fordham L Rev 1, 44 (1982) 
(recommending that multifactor tests be avoided because “[a]n income tax rule that re-
quires an evaluation of all or of a large number of facts is inevitably very costly”). 
 10 Teed v Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F3d 763, 766 (7th Cir 2013). 
 11 See Exacto Spring, 196 F3d at 834–35. 
 12 Bauer v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 748 F2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir 1984). 
 13 Exacto Spring, 196 F3d at 835. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Exacto Spring, 196 F3d at 837. 
2019] Posner on Tax: The Independent Investor Test 1161 
	
After this puzzling outcome, it is hard to disagree with Posner’s 
conclusion that the multifactor test “does not provide adequate 
guidance to a rational decision.”18 
Posner’s critique applies equally well to the eleven-factor test 
used to distinguish debt from equity for income tax purposes ap-
plied in Bauer v Commissioner of Internal Revenue.19 In Bauer, 
some factors favored the taxpayer while others favored the IRS.20 
The tax court weighed the factors one way and found for the IRS, 
disallowing a corporation’s “interest” deductions on payments to 
its two primary shareholders because the payments functioned as 
dividends.21 Faced with the same facts and the same factors, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Tax Court had not ap-
plied the factors appropriately.22 Following Bauer, it is hard to 
predict which interest payments to closely held shareholders will 
be deductible in all but the most extreme circumstances. This is 
unfortunate because the question is a “frequent area of dispute 
between taxpayers and the IRS.”23 
II.  A SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE OF THE INDEPENDENT  
INVESTOR TEST 
To replace the multifactor test, Posner’s Exacto Spring opin-
ion proffered the “independent investor test.”24 In other circuits, 
this test was developed as the “‘lens’ through which they view the 
seven (or however many) factors of the orthodox test.”25 Posner 
showed little patience for such “formality.”26 Instead, he offered 
the independent investor test as a replacement for the multifactor 
test. 
 
 18 Id at 838. 
 19 748 F2d 1365 (1984). 
 20 Id at 1368–71. 
 21 Id at 1367. 
 22 Id at 1371. 
 23 Charles Rubin, IRS Wins Debt vs. Equity Case (JD Supra, Aug 1, 2016), archived 
at http://perma.cc/C6WH-TPJ8. 
 24 Exacto Spring, 196 F3d at 838. 
 25 Id. See also Dexsil Corp v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 147 F3d 96, 101 (2d 
Cir 1998) (“[T]he independent investor test is not a separate autonomous factor; rather, it 
provides a lens through which the entire analysis should be viewed.”) (citations omitted). 
 26 Exacto Spring, 196 F3d at 838. 
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A. Posner’s Independent Investor Test 
The independent investor test returns the question of reason-
able salaries to “basics.”27 As Posner emphasized, “The Internal 
Revenue Code limits the amount of salary that a corporation can 
deduct from its income primarily in order to prevent the corpora-
tion from eluding the corporate income tax by paying dividends 
but calling them salary because salary is deductible and divi-
dends are not.”28 But Posner claimed that it is unlikely that a com-
pany can disguise dividends as salary and still maintain an ade-
quate return to equity. As a result, “[w]hen, notwithstanding the 
CEO’s ‘exorbitant’ salary (as it might appear to a judge or other 
modestly paid official), the investors in his company are obtaining 
a far higher return than they had any reason to expect, his salary 
is presumptively reasonable.”29 
Applying the independent investor test to the facts of Exacto 
Spring, Posner found that Exacto Spring Corporation paid its em-
ployee a reasonable salary. Citing the Tax Court’s findings, 
Posner noted that the corporation paid its employees an average 
of $1.15 million in the years in question30 and that the corporation 
earned about $1 million after deducting the employee’s salary.31 
While the IRS’s experts concluded that “investors in a firm like 
Exacto [Spring] would expect a 13 percent return on their invest-
ment,”32 Posner highlighted that equity investment in Exacto 
Spring in fact yielded 20 percent per year, or $1 million.33 Because 
a 20 percent return ($1 million in earnings) on equity exceeds the 
benchmark 13 percent (which implies roughly $650,000 in earn-
ings) of the independent investor test, Posner found that the sal-
aries paid by Exacto Spring were reasonable.34 
The independent investor test’s appeal is obvious. Rather 
than wrestling with a laundry list of factors, the IRS and judges 
ask one question: What is equity’s required return? If the rate of 
 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id at 839. 
 30 Exacto Spring, 196 F3d at 834 (“In 1993 and 1994, Exacto Spring Corporation, a 
closely held corporation engaged in the manufacture of precision springs, paid its co-
founder, chief executive, and principal owner, William Heitz, $1.3 and $1.0 million, re-
spectively, in salary.”). 
 31 Id at 836 (“[The tax court] found that Exacto had earned more than $1 million in 
each of the years at issue net of Heitz’s supposedly inflated salary.”). 
 32 Id at 838. 
 33 Id at 838–39. 
 34 Exacto Spring, 196 F3d at 839. 
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return exceeds a threshold that would satisfy an “independent in-
vestor” (as it did in Exacto Spring), then the salary is presump-
tively reasonable. And if equity’s return falls short of the bench-
mark, then the salaries paid to owner/employees likely reflect 
disguised dividends. 
With this quantum leap in simplicity over the preexisting 
test, it is no surprise that the independent investor test Posner 
developed in Exacto Spring has been influential. It has been cited 
almost one hundred times in law reviews—a blockbuster case by 
corporate tax standards.35 It is the principal case for teaching the 
meaning of “reasonable” salary in two of the most prominent case-
books on federal income taxation.36 
B. The Flaws of the Independent Investor Test 
But the independent investor test is flawed in practice. Given 
the high volatility of returns on equity, there will be many oppor-
tunities for closely held companies to disguise dividends as salary 
but still have a court find those salaries presumptively reasona-
ble. As a result, Exacto Spring’s independent investor test fails at 
its primary function—distinguishing disguised dividends from 
salary. It gives equity a high return without any volatility, trans-
ferring the volatility to salaries and other fixed claims. 
The independent investor test as applied in Exacto Spring 
treats salary, and not equity, as a “residual” claim to excess or 
deficient corporate profits. Once Exacto Spring Corporation hits 
its benchmark return for equity, it can funnel all returns into sal-
ary and maintain the presumption of reasonability for that sal-
ary. If Exacto Spring’s profits fall short of the benchmark equity 
return with its existing salary structure, by contrast, then it must 
decrease the salaries it pays in order to maintain the same pre-
sumption. The variability in Exacto Spring’s business turns into 
variability in the salaries it pays rather than variability in the 
returns earned by its equity holders. Ordinarily, however, it is 
equity that bears this underlying risk. As a result, the independ-
ent investor test produces radically different outcomes for deter-
mining a reasonable salary when a business experiences ordinary 
volatility. 
 
 35 A Westlaw search of citing references for Exacto Spring conducted in May 2019 
lists 98 citations in law reviews. 
 36 See James J. Freeland, et al, Fundamentals of Federal Income Taxation 343–50 
(Foundation 19th ed 2018); Michael J. Graetz, Deborah H. Schenk, and Anne L. Alstott, 
Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies 243–48 (Foundation 8th ed 2018). 
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We can illustrate the flaws in the independent investor test 
using a combination of annual return on equity data from the 
Russell 2000 Index37 and the facts of Exacto Spring.38 Figure 1 
presents the distribution of annual return on equity in the 
Russell 2000 between 2001 and 2017.39 This distribution gives a 
sense of the volatility in annual returns that an independent in-
vestor would expect from an equity investment.40 Volatility is 
high. An independent equity investor in the tenth percentile for 
annual return on equity earns -20 percent annually. The median 
independent investor earns 8.2 percent per annum, while the in-
dependent equity investor in the ninetieth percentile earns an im-
pressive 23.5 percent annual return. 
We would expect the high volatility in return on equity 
demonstrated in the data. Equity is the residual claimant of the 
firm. It receives a return only after all other claimants have been 
paid. Because equity is the residual, even relatively small fluctu-
ations in revenues, combined with largely fixed costs, can produce 
highly volatile equity returns. Note, moreover, that the data pre-
sented in Figure 1 likely understate the volatility of return on eq-
uity for a firm like Exacto Spring. Publicly traded firms in the 
Russell 2000 are typically less volatile than smaller firms like 
Exacto Spring. 
 
 37 The Russell 2000 Index is the broadest widely used US equity stock index. I use it 
because it includes many smaller public corporations. These corporations will be more 
similar to Exacto Spring than the larger corporations that are the focus of other commonly 
used indexes. 
 38 Return on equity equals net income divided by shareholder’s equity (measured by 
net assets). It is a common measure of a return. 
 39 The data was obtained from Compustat. Net income (NI) and shareholder’s equity 
(SHEQ) data were collected for each firm in the 2018 Russell 2000 for each year from 2001 
to 2017. 
 40 Figure 1 may understate the volatility in returns because it depicts the returns of 
large companies in the Russell 2000. Smaller companies, which are more likely to be the 
subject of the independent investor test, have even more volatile equity returns. See 
Malcolm Baker, Brendan Bradley, and Jeffrey Wurgler, Benchmarks as Limits to 
Arbitrage: Understanding the Low-Volatility Anomaly, 67 Fin Analysis J 40, 45 (2011) 
(stating that “[t]he top volatility quintile tends to be small stocks”). As a result, Figure 1 
should be used for illustrative purposes only—to give a sense of just how variable equity 
returns can be. 
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FIGURE 1:  DISTRIBUTION OF ANNUAL RETURN ON EQUITY, 
RUSSELL 2000, 2001–2017 
 
Suppose that the volatility in return on equity depicted in 
Figure 1 approximates the volatility of the combined value of 
Exacto Spring’s equity earnings and its salary payment to its 
chief executive/controlling shareholder.41 How often does the in-
dependent investor test, using this data, produce unusual results 
for the maximum reasonable salary? (For a tabular presentation 
of the results discussed here, see Table 1.) 
Suppose further that the true arm’s length market value of 
the executive’s salary is $1.15 million, which is what Exacto 
Spring’s executive in fact got paid. 
At the beginning of the year in question, Exacto Spring had 
approximately $5 million in equity.42 After paying the proposed 
executive salary of $1.15 million, Exacto Spring had a 20 percent 
return left over for its shareholders, or $1 million—an equity 
return that would be at roughly the eightieth percentile for the 
 
 41 If salary is truly a constant fixed cost, then it does not change the volatility of 
earnings. (The variance of a random variable plus a constant is equal to the variance of 
the random variable.) See Variance (StatLect), archived at http://perma.cc/CU3G-6JT9. 
 42 One million dollars in profit yielded a return on investment of 20 percent, implying 
that the underlying investment was $5 million. (0.2 = $1 m/x.) Exacto Spring, 196 F3d at 
836, 838–39. (0.13 x $5 million = $650,000.) 
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Russell 2000 between 2001 and 2017, for a total cash available for 
salary and equity of $2.15 million ($1.15 million + $1 million). 
(See Row C of Table 1.) An independent equity investor would 
have been satisfied with only 13 percent, or $650,000 ($5 million 
x 0.13). As a result, the $1.15 million salary not only was pre-
sumptively reasonable; the salary could have been even higher. 
Exacto Spring could have paid salary up to $1.5 million without 
violating the independent investor test. (Column 4 of Row C.) 
But now suppose instead that Exacto Spring had a bad year, 
earning -10 percent, or -$500,000 ($5 million x (-.1)) for equity 
(depicted in Row A of Table 1) (A total of $650,000 (-$500,000 + 
$1.15 million), is thus available for both executive salary and eq-
uity). This would be approximately a fifteenth percentile annual 
return on equity for a Russell 2000 firm. Fifteenth percentile 
years would undoubtedly be disappointing for investors but 
hardly unprecedented. 
TABLE 1:  MAXIMUM REASONABLE SALARY AS A FUNCTION OF 
EQUITY RETURNS 
Row 
Return Percentile 
(Based on 
Russell 2000  
Annual Return on 
Equity) 
(1) 
Total $ 
Available for 
Salary and 
Dividends 
(2) 
Return to Equity 
Holders to Satisfy 
Independent 
Investor Test 
(13 Percent of $5 
Million in Equity) 
(3) 
Maximum 
Reasonable 
Salary for Chief 
Executive 
((2)-(3)) 
(4) 
A 15th $650k $650k $0 
B 58th $1.8m $650k $1.15m 
C 80th $2.15m $650k $1.5m 
D 94th $2.95m $650k $2.3m 
This -10 percent return on equity falls far short of the bench-
mark of 13 percent. Applying the independent investor test, a 
court should find the executive’s $1.15 million salary unreasona-
ble. To satisfy the independent investor test, Exacto Spring equity 
needs to earn $650,000, rather than its actual performance of 
-$500,000, a difference of $1.15 million. For independent inves-
tors to earn the benchmark 13 percent return, the executive can-
not be paid anything. In a bad year, the independent investor test 
yields a maximum reasonable salary of zero—even a dollar of sal-
ary means that the independent investors earn below their bench-
mark return, failing the independent investor test for the maxi-
mum reasonable salary. (Column 4 of Row A.) 
Perhaps the independent investor test is flawed when the 
firm performs poorly but provides a useful benchmark when the 
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firm performs well. After all, the IRS is more likely to claim that 
a salary is an unreasonable disguised dividend when returns are 
high rather than low. Suppose that Exacto Spring has a very good 
year, earning a ninety-fourth percentile return on equity of 36 
percent. Independent investors earn profits of $1.8 million. (See 
Row D of Table 1.) Because this return greatly exceeds the bench-
mark $650,000 return investors expect, the salary of $1.15 million 
would be presumptively reasonable. So far, so good. But what if 
the firm tries to press its luck and tries to add to the executive 
salary, disguising a dividend? The firm could double the execu-
tive’s salary to $2.3 million without running afoul of the inde-
pendent investor test. (Column 4 of Row D.) The independent in-
vestor test thus gives firms considerable scope to disguise 
dividends as salary during good years. 
Because equity returns are so volatile, the independent in-
vestor test provides little useful data for salaries. In bad years for 
equity (Row A), the test produces maximum reasonable salaries 
that are much too low. In good years (Rows C and D), the test 
produces maximum reasonable salaries that allow closely held 
firms to disguise significant dividends. With maximum reasona-
ble salaries fluctuating so widely (note the variation of Column 4 
in Table 1), the independent investor test treats salary, rather 
than equity, as the residual claimant. 
The mechanics of the independent investor test thus perform 
poorly. Equity returns are too volatile for benchmarking salaries. 
But Posner’s opinion suggests another, less developed, applica-
tion of the independent investor test that is workable and shows 
the theoretical strength of his test. In Exacto Spring, the chief 
executive was the majority shareholder, but he wasn’t the only 
one. Other shareholders held equity in the firm but didn’t work 
there.43 These independent equity investors provide an alterna-
tive check on the executive’s salary. Disguising dividends as sal-
ary will be rejected by these investors because salary goes entirely 
to the executive while dividends are shared pro rata by all equity 
holders. Thus, if the minority shareholders approve an executive 
salary, as they did in Exacto Spring, then we can be confident that 
the salary does not include disguised dividends. The independent 
investor test applied to reasonable salary lives, but only when 
there are actual, rather than hypothetical, independent investors 
to approve the salary. 
 
 43 See Exacto Spring, 196 F3d at 837. 
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III.  THE INDEPENDENT INVESTOR TEST AND DEBT AND EQUITY 
In theory, the independent investor test works well. The vol-
atility of equity returns, however, limits the test’s utility when 
applied to the problem of disguising dividends as salary. If there 
is only one investor/employee, then there is no independent inves-
tor to approve a salary, nor is there a meaningful restriction on 
salaries that can be backed out from returns on equity. 
In other cases, however, independent investor returns are 
much less volatile. Consider public debt markets. While holders 
of publicly traded stock can reasonably expect returns, outside of 
capital gains, to range from a significant loss to a spectacular 
gain, bond creditors receive an annual, fixed coupon payment.44 
Creditors are not residual claimants. Their return cannot be 
above their fixed claim. And their return is also unlikely to be 
below this fixed return unless the company wishes to face litiga-
tion over a default. As a result, debt returns vary much less from 
year to year than equity returns. 
Because of debt’s relatively low volatility, the Posner inde-
pendent investor test, applied to debt, can replace the fraught 
multifactor test currently used to distinguish debt from equity in 
closely held firms. 
In Bauer, two owner/employees of a corporation regularly ad-
vanced credit to the corporation when the corporation needed cap-
ital.45 The credit was payable on demand but did not require reg-
ular payments of interest or principal.46 Each year, however, the 
corporation made an interest payment to the shareholders dis-
charging the corporation’s accrued interest obligation under the 
terms of the debt.47 At times, the value of this interest payment 
was offset by the value of additional credit extended by the 
shareholders.48 
The corporation claimed a deduction for the interest pay-
ments.49 The IRS disallowed the deduction, arguing that the 
advances from the shareholder/creditor to the corporation were 
 
 44 Creditors can make a capital gain or loss if interest rates fluctuate. This analysis, 
like the analysis of equity returns, ignores capital gains and losses to focus on rates of 
return implied by cash flows. 
 45 Bauer, 748 F2d at 1366. 
 46 Id at 1367. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id at 1366–67. 
 49 Bauer, 748 F2d at 1366. See also 26 USC § 162. 
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equity and the payments from the corporation to the shareholders 
were nondeductible debt.50 
The Ninth Circuit applied an eleven-factor test to resolve the 
question. But it devoted the bulk of its analysis to just one of the 
eleven factors—whether or not the corporation was thinly capi-
talized.51 The Ninth Circuit found that the corporation was not 
thinly capitalized and further noted that many, but certainly not 
all, of the other factors favored the corporation.52 The Ninth 
Circuit gave no indication about how the eleven factors were to be 
aggregated to produce a decision. But the court allowed the cor-
poration to deduct the payments.53 As noted above, Posner’s cri-
tique of the multifactor test used by the court below in Exacto 
Spring applies with little modification to this multifactor test. 
Posner’s independent investor test offers a considerable im-
provement over the multifactor test. The independent investor 
test asks: Do the interest payments from the corporation to its 
creditors exceed the normal return that an independent investor 
would expect on a similar loan to the corporation? If so, then the 
interest deductions should be disallowed. If not, then the deduc-
tions should be permitted. The independent investor test replaces 
a quagmire with a relatively straightforward inquiry. And the in-
quiry reflects fundamentals. If a corporation deducts interest in 
amounts similar to what they would deduct if credit came from a 
third party, then there is less concern that the corporation is dis-
guising dividends as interest. 
Because debt is much less volatile than equity, the independ-
ent investor test should provide reasonable guidelines to courts. 
In Bauer, the interest rate in question was 7 to 10 percent per 
annum.54 If this rate exceeded the interest rates earned by inde-
pendent investors in credit markets by a considerable amount, 
 
 50 Bauer, 748 F2d at 1367. 
 51 Id at 1368–71. The Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub L No 115-97, 131 Stat 2054 
(2017), codified at 26 USC § 1 et seq, introduced a cap on deductibility for corporate inter-
est payments. See 26 USC § 163(j). The cap, however, does not apply to corporations with 
gross receipts under $25 million. See 26 USC §§ 163(j)(3), 448(c). Most closely held corpo-
rations, the only category for which the debt/equity distinction matters, will fall below this 
cap and be allowed to deduct unlimited amounts of interest. More generally, the Tax Cut 
and Jobs Act of 2017’s reduction in the corporate income tax rate diminishes tax ad-
vantages of debt (taxed once, at the individual rate), relative to equity (taxed twice at the 
preferred corporate rate and again at the preferred dividend rate). As a result, the current 
rate structure reduces the likelihood of cases like Bauer. 
 52 Bauer, 748 F2d at 1370–71. 
 53 Id at 1371. 
 54 Id at 1367. 
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then it is unlikely that the payments truly reflected interest. In 
fact, these interest rates were roughly in line with investment-
grade bond yields during the same period, suggesting that exces-
sive interest deductions were not being taken.55 
Even applied to debt, the independent investor inquiry is no 
panacea. Very risky debt may yield returns similar, with similar 
variability, to equity. In these circumstances, the independent in-
vestor test provides little guidance to courts. As a result, the in-
dependent investor test’s application to debt must be confined to 
relatively ordinary capital structures. 
CONCLUSION 
In spite of (or maybe because of) its imperfections, the hypo-
thetical independent investor test of Exacto Spring reveals two 
important virtues of Judge Posner’s tax jurisprudence relative to 
the multifactor test for reasonable salary that came before it. 
First, judicial tests and decisions that focus on economic sub-
stance, like Judge Posner’s, can be critiqued and improved di-
rectly. If one substantive account is incomplete or does not apply 
well to changed circumstances, then it can be replaced with a bet-
ter account. Multifactor tests, by contrast, often devolve into ar-
guments about the importance of each factor, a far less productive 
dialogue. 
Second, judicial tests focused on substance have much 
broader applicability than the multifactor tests that Posner criti-
cized in Exacto Spring. The independent investor test can be ap-
plied, with suitable modification, to distinguish debt from equity 
and to distinguish salary from equity. The multifactor tests ap-
plied to these two problems, by contrast, share little in common. 
If tax law is a morass of multifactor test doctrine rather than sim-
ple Posnerian tests of economic substance, then we should not be 
surprised if many observers consider it excessively complex. As in 
so many areas of law, in tax Judge Posner showed us a better way. 
 
 55 See Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) Graph: Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate 
Bond Yield (WAAA) (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), online at http://fred.stlouisfed.org/ 
series/WAAA (visited May 13, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable) (fluctuating from roughly 
7 percent in 1972 to between 8 and 9 percent in 1976). 
